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NOTES
Constitutional Law: Can the President of the United
States Force His Military Advisers to Testify When They
Wish to Claim Their Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination?
On February 12, 1987, President Reagan announced he would not order
Admiral John Poindexter or Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North to testify in
the Iran-Contra hearings without immunity. This announcement raises the
question of whether President Reagan, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Armed Forces, could have lawfully forced Admiral Poindexter
and Lieutenant Colonel North to testify before congressional committees
without statutory immunity from criminal prosecution. The answer to this
question will certainly not affect the results of the Iran-Contra investigation;
however, the principles inherent in this issue are equally applicable to any
future situations in which presidential military advisers are asked to testify
about their duties. Therefore, the analysis will proceed from a general point
of view, focusing not on the identities of the current President or current
military advisers but on the relationship between a President and his military
advisers.
It is not the purpose of this note to determine the effects of an adviser's
decision to testify out of loyalty to, or other personal feelings for, the Presi-
dent. Such a decision would appear to be a personal choice of the adviser,
made freely, and should therefore constitute a waiver of the privilege against
self-incrimination. This note instead considers the possibility of a President
ordering his military advisers to testify and threatening them with punitive
action, such as removal from office or loss of military rank and benefits,
if they refuse. Thus, the issue becomes whether the President can lawfully
use threats of punitive action to force his military advisers to testify without
statutory immunity.
A presidential military adviser who is ordered to testify without statutory
immunity and threatened with punitive action if he refuses will have a choice:
he can either testify and claim protection from the use of his testimony against
him, or he can refuse to testify and claim protection from the threatened
punitive action. The remedies available to the adviser in each situation will
determine the constitutionality of the presidential order.
Although these claims are grounded in the fifth amendment privilege to
avoid self-incrimination, several factors distinguish them from ordinary fifth
amendment claims. First, the President's military advisers are officers in the
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United States Armed Forces.' When acting as Commander-in-Chief, the Presi-
dent is their military commander.2 The authority and discipline inherent in
the military relationship between commander and subordinate may give the
President the latitude to force his military subordinates to testify without
statutory immunity.
However, while the President's military advisers are military officers, they
occupy 'positions that are essentially political in nature.' The political nature
of the positions may lead the President's military advisers to be treated as
political appointees, rather than military officers, so that the President's
military authority no longer reaches them; in that case the President may not
have the power to coerce their testimony. Alternatively, the political nature
of the positions may have the opposite effect, giving the President the latitude
to make continued political employment contingent upon prompt and truthful
testimony.
Because these factors are so peculiar to the relationship between the Presi-
dent and his military advisers, authority on the issue is nonexistent. However,
the fifth amendment protection available to military advisers should be dis-
cernible by analogy to similar fifth amendment claims raised by civilians. Thus,
this note will first examine the scope of the fifth amendment privilege to avoid
self-incrimination in a civilian context to determine the limits placed on the
use of threats to coerce self-incrimination.
Second, this note will determine whether the characteristics that distinguish
military from civilian society warrant a more limited fifth amendment privilege
for military personnel than that which exists for civilians. Courts use the doc-
trine of justiciability to distinguish constitutional claims by military person-
nel from similar claims by civilians. Thus, the justiciability of constitutional
claims raised by military personnel will be examined. The principles defining
the justiciability of military constitutional claims will then be applied to the
assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by military personnel. This
analysis should determine whether claims for protection from self-
incrimination, found to be within the scope of fifth amendment protection
offered to civilians, will be offered by the courts to military personnel as well.
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall ... be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." ' 4 This constitutional
provision gives every individual the privilege to avoid self-incrimination without
penalty. The Supreme Court has strictly protected the right to exercise this
1. Admiral Poindexter is a naval officer and Lieutenant Colonal North is a Marine Corps
officer.
2. U.S. CoNar. art. II, § 2, c1. 1, provides that: "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the AAmy and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States."
3. Admiral Poindexter was the Chief of the National Security Council. Lieutenant Colonel
North was the Deputy Director for Political-Military Affairs in the National Security Council.




privilege free from coercion; however, because the Court's protection is
necessarily remedial in nature, Supreme Court protection against coercion must
be examined in two situations. First, how does the Supreme Court protect
a person's privilege to avoid self-incrimination where that person has been
coerced into incriminating himself? Second, how does the Supreme Court pro-
tect a person's privilege to avoid self-incrimination where that person has in-
voked the privilege and, as a result, been subjected to punitive action?
The first situation is addressed in Garrity v. New Jersey.5 Several police
officers were suspected of fixing traffic tickets and were questioned during
a state Attorney General investigation. Prior to questioning, each officer was
told that: (1) anything he said could be used against him in a state criminal
case; (2) he could refuse to answer if he believed his answers could incriminate
him; and (3) he could be removed from office pursuant to a state statute
if he refused to answer. 6 The officers answered the questions and the answers
were used to convict them of fixing traffic tickets. After the convictions were
upheld on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.
The Court found the police officers were presented with an unconstitutional
Hobson's choice prior to questioning7:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to
incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of livelihood
or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free
choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like inter-
rogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona, is "likely
to exert such pressure upon an indivdual as to disable him from
making a free and rational choice." We think the statements were
5. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
6. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965) provided that:
Any person holding or who has held any elective or appointive public office, posi-
tion or employment (whether state, county or municipal), who refuses to testify
upon matters relating to the office, position or employment in any criminal pro-
ceeding wherein he is a defendant or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecu-
tion, upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him
to be a witness against himself or refuses to waive immunity when called by a
grand jury to testify thereon or who willfully refuses or fails to appear before any
court, commission or body of this state which has. the right to inquire under oath
upon matters relating to the office, position or employment of such person or who,
having been sworn, refuses to testify or to answer any material question upon the
ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a witness
against himself, shall, if holding elective or public office, position or employment,
be removed therefrom or shall thereby forfeit his office, position or employment
and any vested or future right of tenure or pension granted to him by any law
of this state provided the inquiry relates to a matter which occurred or arose within
the preceding five years. Any person so forfeiting his office, position or employ-
ment shall not thereafter be eligible for election or appointment to any public of-
fice, position or employment in this state.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494 n.1 (emphasis added).
7. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496.
1987]
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infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and
cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions.,
The state argued that the police officers were given a choice between speaking
or not speaking and voluntarily chose to speak. Therefore, the state claimed
the officers waived their right to avoid self-incrimination.
The Court rejected this argument because it would allow the state to force
everyone to speak.9 When questioned, a suspect always has a choice between
speaking and not speaking; but the suspect is faced with the possibility of
criminal liability if he speaks. If the state's reasoning were accepted, authorities
could present every suspect with a harsher penalty for not speaking than the
possible criminal penalty he might receive for speaking.' 0 Faced with such
a choice, every suspect would choose to speak because it would always be
in his best interest to choose the lesser of the two penalties. The state could
then claim every suspect freely chose to speak and voluntarily waived the
privilege to avoid self-incrimination."
The Court found such a result impermissible; that a choice is made accord-
ing to self-interest is the essence of duress, not free choice.12 Therefore, the
Court held the privilege to avoid self-incrimination, and the corresponding
protection against coerced statements, prohibits use in subsequent criminal
proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office. 3
Such protection extends to all individuals. '
4
The protection provided by Garrity is, in essence, a form of constructive
immunity.'5 This constructive immunity stems not from the employer, the
judiciary, or the state or federal government, but from the fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination. Thus, when a public employee is asked
to testify about matters that may subject him to criminal prosecution, the
process may be viewed as a two-step process. In the absence of statutory im-
munity granted by the government or other prosecuting authority, a public
8. Id. at 497-98 (citation omitted).
9. Id. at 49.3.
10. Id. (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1918)).
11. Id. at 493.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5).
14. Id.
15. The Garrrty decision found a form of "constructive immunity" in the fifth amendment
that protects against coerced self-incrimination. Id. at 500. Because it arises from the fifth amend-
ment, this immunity would presumably extend no further than the minimum immunity necessary
to fully prote.:t the privilege against self-incrimination. The minimum immunity necessary to
protect the fifth amendment privilege is use-restriction immunity. See United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115, 123 (1980) (Court recognized that immunity statute was designed by Congress
to be as broad as, but no broader than, the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
which is reflected by the use-restriction immunity concept); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 477 n.8
(7th Cir. 1977) (court recognized that the use-restriction immunity concept reflects the minimum
scope of immunity that is constitutionally required), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1980). Thus,





employee may refuse to testify and claim the fifth amendment privilege to
avoid self-incrimination. If the government then obtains the employee's
testimony by threatening him with dismissal, the fifth amendment provides
the employee with constructive immunity: his testimony cannot be used against
him. If the government tries to use the employee's testimony against him in
a later criminal action, the employee has a judicial remedy.
The protection available when a person has refused to testify and has been
penalized for invoking the privilege to avoid self-incrimination is illustrated
in Spevack v. Klein. 6 In Spevack an attorney was disbarred because he in-
voked his privilege to avoid self-incrimination and refused to testify in a judicial
proceeding. After the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed his disbar-
ment, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. As in Garrity, the
Court refused to allow any penalty to attend an individual's assertion of the
privilege to avoid self-incrimination.'
7
In this context "penalty" is not restricted to fine or imprison-
ment. It means. . .the imposition of any sanction which makes
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege "costly."
The threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing,
professional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of
compulsion to make a lawyer relinquish the privilege. That threat
is indeed as powerful an instrument of compulsion as "the use
of legal process to force from the lips of the accused individual
the evidence necessary to convict him. .. ." We find no room in
the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people
so as to deny it to some and extend it to others. Lawyers are not
excepted from the words "No person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself"; and we can
imply no exception.' 8
Thus, the Court reversed the lawyer's disbarment. 9
Justice White, however, raised a point in dissent that bears on the constitu-
tionality of attempts to coerce testimony from public employees. Justice White
argued that governments should be allowed fo use threats of discharge to com-
pel public employees to testify and should be allowed to discharge those who
16. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
17. Id. at 514.
18. Id. at 515-16.
19. Id. at 519. See also Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977) (statute held uncon-
stitutional which divested attorney of his state political party offices when, in response to a sub-
poena, he asserted privilege to avoid self-incrimination and refused to waive immunity from
criminal prosecution); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (statute held unconstitutional
which required all public contracts to include a provision that, if a contractor was called to
testify about his contracts with the state and refused to testify or waive immunity, all of his
contracts with the state would be canceled and he would be prevented from contracting with
the state for'five years); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (statute held unconstitutional
which caused police officer to be dismissed when he asserted privilege to avoid self-incrimination
and refused to testify before grand jury and waive immunity from criminal prosecution).
19871
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refuse.20 Garrity firmly established that the fifth amendment fully protects
the privilege to avoid self-incrimination by prohibiting the use, in any subse-
quent criminal action, of testimony gained through threats of loss of employ-
ment.' Thus, Justice White argued that no violation of the privilege against
self-incrimination can occur where a government threatens loss of employ-
ment to coerce testimony by its employees-an employee cannot incriminate
himself because his testimony cannot be used in any subsequent criminal ac-
tion. 22
This argument was explored in Gardner v. Broderick3 and Uniformed
Sanitation Men Association v. Commissioner of Sanitation.24 In Gardner a
policeman was called before a grand jury that was investigating bribery and
corruption of police officers. He was advised of his privilege against self-
incrimination but was asked to sign a waiver of immunity and told he would
be fired if he refused to sign. He refused to sign the waiver and was fired
pursuant to a city ordinance.
2
-
The city attempted to distinguish Gardner from Spevack on the basis that
the duties oF a public official, such as a policeman, differ from the duties
of the attorney in Spevack. Unlike an attorney, who is responsible to his client,
a police officer owes his entire loyalty and allegiance to the citizens of the
city or state that employs him. Accordingly, the city claimed an interest in
forcing the officer to account for his actions. The Court recognized this
distinction:
We agree that these factors differentiate the situations. If ap-
pellant, a policeman, had refused to answer questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official
duties, without being required to waive his immunity with respect
to the use of his answers or the fruits thereof in a criminal prose-
20. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 532 (White, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
22. Id.
23. 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
24. 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
25. Section 1123 of the New York City Charter provided that:
If any councilman or other officer or employee of the city shall, after lawful notice
or process, wilfully refuse or fail to appear before any court or judge, any legislative
committee, or any officer, board or body authorized to conduct any hearing or
inquiry, or having appeared shall refuse to testify or to answer any question re-
garding the property, government or affairs of the city or of any county included
within its tenitorial limits, or regarding the nomination, election, appointment or
official conduct of any officer or employee of the city or of any such county, on
the ground that his answer would tend to incriminate him, or shall refuse to waive
immunity from prosecution on account of any such matter in relation to which
he may be asked to testify upon any such hearing or inquiry, his term or tenure
of office or employment shall terminate and such office or employment shall be
vacant, and lie shall not be eligible to election or appointment to any office or
employment under the city or any agency.
Gardner, 392 U.S. at 275 n.3 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 40
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cution of himself, the privilege against self-incrinination would not
have been a bar to his dismissal.
The facts of this case, however, do not present this issue....
[Petitioner] was discharged from office, not for failure to answer
relevant questions about his official duties, but for refusal to waive
a constitutional right. He was dismissed for failure to relinquish
the protections of the privilege against self-incrimination .... He
was dismissed solely for his refusal to waive the immunity to which
he is entitled if he is required to testify despite his constitutional
privilege.
2 6
Thus, the Court found that the policeman had to be reinstated but expressly
based its decision on the fact that the employee was discharged for failing
to waive the constructive immunity provided by the fifth amendment through
Garrity.
27
In Sanitation Men the Court considered a claim for reinstatement by a group
of city employees who were discharged when they refused to waive immunity.
Again, the Court noted the difference between a discharge based on a refusal
to answer questions and a discharge based on a refusal to waive immunity:
Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account
for their conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed
for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against
self-incrimination. They were discharged for refusal to expose
themselves to criminal prosecution based on testimony which they
would give under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege.
As we stated in Gardner v. Broderick, if New York had de-
manded that petitioners answer questions specifically, directly, and
narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain
of dismissal from public employment without requiring relinquish-
ment of the benefits of the constitutional privilege, and if they had
refused to do so, this case would be entirely different. In such a
case, the employee's right to immunity as a result of his compelled
testimony would not be at stake.28
The Court ordered the petitioners reinstated because their dismissal was pre-
mised on a refusal to waive the constructive immunity provided by Garrity.2
The strong dicta in these two cases indicates that a public employer may
use threats of dismissal to force a public employee to answer questions
specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official
duties, so long as the employer does not attempt to coerce the employee into
26. Id. at 278 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 279.
28. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 283-84 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 285.
1987] NOTES
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waiving his fifth amendment rights. If the employee refuses to respond, he
may be dismissed. Such punitive action will not violate the employee's privilege
against self-ircrimination because the employee could not have incriminated
himself by answering the questions. The threat of dismissal provides the
employee with constructive immunity under Garrity; his testimony under threat
of dismissal cannot be used against him in a later criminal action. Thus, the
employee's fifth amendment privilege remains protected.
The argumznt that Garrity's protection against self-incrimination should
allow a government to force its employees to testify is analogous to situations
where a su:spect has been given statutory immunity by a prosecuting author-
ity. Statutory immunity prevents a suspect from incriminating himself. By
dissolving the opportunity for self-incrimination, the statutory immunity in
effect replaces the suspect's fifth amendment privilege.30 The suspect must
then testify and can be found in contempt if he refuses to do so.' The pro-
secuting authority can also use the suspect's testimony in later perjury pro-
ceedings if the suspect lies.32 The Supreme Court's dicta in Gardner and Sanita-
tion Men suggests that the constructive immunity provided by Garrity, like
statutory immunity, replaces the fifth amendment privilege when a public
employee is threatened with dismissal for refusing to testify.
However, a public employee's privilege to avoid self-incrimination is violated
30. In re Dairy, 549 F.2d 469, 478 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). A suspect
may argue that n.-ither statutory immunity nor the constructive immunity provided by Garrity
can entirely replace the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the suspect's
testimony may stibject him to adverse consequences he would not suffer were he not forced
to testify. For example, immunity may not prevent the use of testimony in a later civil suit,
and it may not p-event a prosecution for perjury if the testimony is false. Testifying with im-
munity may also subject the suspect to loss of employment or loss of reputation.
The United States Supreme Court addressed this reasoning in United States v. Apfelbaum,
445 U.S. 115 (1980), where it considered whether truthful statements made by a suspect after
statutory immunity was granted could be used against the suspect in a later perjury prosecution,
The Court concIkded that the scope of protection offered by the privilege is" not defined by
the benefits one might gain by remaining silent. "For a grant of immunity to provide protection
'coextensive' with that of the Fifth Amendment, it need not treat the witness as if he had remained
silent." Id. at 124-27. The Court thus allowed truthful statements to be used against the suspect
in the perjury prosecution, along with the allegedly false statements. Id. at 127.
The Court's reasoning should apply as well to public employees protected from self-incrimination
by Garrity's ccnstructive immunity as to suspects protected by statutory immunity. Thus, where
a public employee is protected by Garrity from self-incrimination, the fact that the employee's
testimony may place him in a worse position than if he had not testified should not prevent
the government from using threats of punitive action to coerce the employee's testimony.
31. United States v. Hockenberry, 474 F.2d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 1973) ("Congress had authorized
and the courts have sanctioned judicial compulsion of otherwise self-incriminating testimony so
long as full protention is given the witness against injury through future incriminating use of
the compelled statement.").
32. Apfelberum, 445 U.S. at 126 ("All of the Courts of Appeals, however, have recognized
that the provision in 18 U.S.C. § 6002 allowing prosecutions for perjury in answering questions
following a grant of immunity does not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination. And we ourselves have repeatedly held that perjury prosecutions are per-
missible for fah;e answers to questions following the grant of immunity."). See also United States
v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
[Vol. 40
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if the government attempts to coerce him into waiving the fifth amendment's
constructive immunity provided under Garrity. Without that constructive im-
munity, the employee's fifth amendment privilege is no longer protected; the
employee could incriminate himself by testifying because his testimony could
be used against him in later criminal actions. The attempt to force the employee
to waive Garrity's constructive immunity and testify is an attempt to coerce
self-incrimination and, therefore, violates the fifth amendment. Any punitive
action taken against the employee for his refusal to waive fifth amendment
protection is unconstitutional and will be redressed by the Court.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with this reasoning in
Gulden v. McCorkle.33 After a bomb threat forced the evacuation of the Dallas
Public Works Department, the Director ordered all department employees to
submit to a polygraph examination about the incident. Employees were also
instructed to sign waivers consenting to the test.34 Two employees refused
to take the polygraph test or sign waivers. They were later fired.
The district court found no evidence that the city had asked the employees
to expressly waive their privilege to avoid self-incrimination. The waivers sub-
mitted to the employees merely asked for consent to the polygraph test. The
waivers did not require the employees to waive their fifth amendment rights.
After reviewing the major Supreme Court decisions on the issue, the Fifth
Circuit upheld the city's punitive action. 35 The court noted that a public
employee cannot be compelled, through threats of dismissal, to waive the con-
structive immunity provided by Garrity.36 However, a public employee may
be required to answer "even potentially incriminating questions" so long as
the government has not tried to coerce the employee into waiving fifth amend-
ment protection.
37
In summary, as these cases emphasize, it is the compelled answer
33. 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983).
34. The Department waiver provided:
I, - of sound mind and body, age - , do hereby submit to a
polygraph examination given by -, a certified polygraph examiner in the
State of Texas. I understand that I have been ordered to take a polygraph examin-
ation by the Director of Public Works in conducting an administrative investiga-
tion for possible City of Dallas Code of Conduct violations. I hereby give my con-
sent to __ to conduct this polygraph examination concerning the subject
matter previously discussed.
The polygraph firm's waiver provided:
I, -, hereby consent and voluntarily agree to allow Baker-Holden-McElroy
& Associates to administer a polygraph (lie detection) examination to me. I volun-
tarily consent to this examination of my own free will, and state that no duress,
threats, or coercion have been placed on me to take this examination. I have not
been promised anything of value, reward, or immunity to induce me to consent
to this examination. I understand that I have the right to stop my polygraph exam-
ination at any time I desire.
Gulden, 680 F.2d at 1071 nn. 2, 3.
35. Id. at 1076.
36. Id. at 1073-74.
37. Id. at 1074.
1987] NO TES
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in combination with the compelled waiver of immunity that creates
the Hobson's choice for the employee. It is a discharge predicated
on the employee's refusal to waive immunity which is for-
bidden ... ,not a discharge based on refusal to answer where there is
no demand by the employer of the relinquishment of the constitu-
tional right 8
The employees argued that once they claimed their fifth amendment
privilege, the city had to make an affirmative offer of immunity before it
could require a polygraph test. They claimed that because the city failed to
offer them immunity, participation in the polygraph tests would have operated
as a waiver of immunity. The court rejected this argument."
[The plaintiffs'] theory that an affirmative tender of immunity was
mandated by the holdings of Lefkowitz I and II, Sanitation Men
and Gardner finds no support in those cases. It was rather the ex-
plicit demand by the employer of the waiver of immunity on pen-
alty of job loss that created the constitutional infirmity. An
employee who is compelled to answer questions (but who is not
compelled to waive immunity) is protected by Garrity from subse-
quent use of those answers in a criminal prosecution. It is the very
fact that the testimony was compelled which prevents its use in
subsequent proceedings, not any affirmative tender of immuni-
ty.... There was no requirement of surrender here. Failure to
tender immunity was simply not the equivalent of an impermissi-
ble compelled waiver of immunity.40
The court expressed doubt that an affirmative duty to advise an employee
of immunity could be found in any Supreme Court authority. However, the
court declined to speculate in this case beyond finding that no such duty ex-
isted at the early stages in the investigation when the polygraph tests were
requested.
4'
The remedy of a public employee faced with loss of employment for his
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 1074-75.
40. Id. at 1075.
41. Id. at 1075-76. Other courts have interpreted Gardner and Sanitation Men in the same
manner as the Fifth Circuit in Gulden. These courts support the view that the use of coercion
to obtain a waiver of immunity transforms a legitimate government attempt to obtain an ac-
counting of its employees' actions into an impermissible violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Thus, in the absence of an attempt to coerce a waiver, a government may use
threats of dismissal to force a public employee to testify about his duties and may dismiss the
employee if he refuses to respond. See United States v. Shamy, 656 F.2d 951, 959 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 939 (1982); Diebold v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 611 F.2d 697, 701
(8th Cir. 1979).
Some courts have interpreted Gardner and Sanitation Men to require a government to inform
its employees that their statements will not be used against them in later criminal proceedings
before the government may use threats of dismissal to force employees to testify. Devine v.




refusal to testify therefore appears to depend upon what the government asks
him to do. If the government asks the employee to answer questions nar-
rowly tailored and directly related to his duties, on threat of dismissal if he
refuses, then the government may dismiss him for failing to respond. Under
Garrity, the fifth amendment would have provided the employee with con-
structive immunity had he testified, thus preventing any self-incrimination.
Because that protection is available, the employee has no remedy for his
dismissal. If, however, the government asks the employee to waive immunity,
a constitutional violation occurs. The employee may not be discharged for
refusing to waive that immunity.
If the President's military advisers are viewed as civilian employees of the
federal government, they should have the protection outlined above. Thus,
an adviser who testifies in the face of threats of removal from office, or worse,
is protected from the use of his testimony in any subsequent criminal action
against him. The coerced nature of the testimony provides the adviser with
constructive immunity under Garrity.
If the President merely orders the advisers to answer questions narrowly
tailored and directly related to their duties, his action is constitutional; the
advisers must testify or risk punitive action. Again, Garrity would prohibit
the use of their testimony against them, preventing any self-incrimination.
If the advisers refuse to testify, they are subject to punitive action and no
constitutional violation will occur. However, a presidential order to testify
and waive immunity will violate the fifth amendment. Any punitive action
directed toward the advisers for their refusal to waive immunity will be un-
constitutional and can be remedied in court. Thus, the President's action ap-
pears unconstitutional only in this latter instance.
Constitutional Claims Asserted by Military Personnel
The above analysis determined the scope of fifth amendment protection
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 975 (1975); Confederation of Police v. Conlisk, 489 F.2d 891,
894 (7th Cir. 1973).
However, requiring public employers to affirmatively notify employees that their statements
will not be used against them overlooks the fact that it is the very attempt by a government
to use an employee's testimony against him that gives rise to Garrity's protection. In Garrity
the police officers were warned that (1) they could remain silent; (2) if they remained silent,
they would be fired; and (3) if they spoke, their statements could be used against them. Garrity,
385 U.S. 493, 494 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 5-15. The second and third warn-
ings created the conflict necessary to invoke the fifth amendment's constructive immunity: a
choice between job forfeiture and self-incrimination. Constructive immunity protected the policemen
from self-incrimination, not because the government indicated their statements would not be
used against them but because the government indeed warned that their testimony would be
used against them. Id. at 496-98.
If the government had instead advised the officers that their statements would not be used
against them, the choice between self-incrimination and job forfeiture would not have existed.
Consequently, the constructive immunity provided by the fifth amendment would never have
arisen. A duty to advise employees that their testimony cannot be used against them is logically
inconsistent with the Garrity decision because fifth amendment constructive immunity can arise
undei Garrity only where the government intends to use an employee's testimony against him.
1987]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1987
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
against coerced self-incrimination the President's military advisers should en-
joy if they are viewed as civilian government employees. However, the ad-
visers are members of the United States Armed Forces. Their military status
creates two issues. First, if the advisers testify under coercion, will their military
status deny them judicial enforcement of the constructive immunity available
to civilians in such situations? Second, will their military status deny the ad-
visers judicial protection against coerced waivers of that constructive immunity?
Federal courts have traditionally been reluctant to entertain claims brought
by military personnel that entail review of military actions and use the doc-
trine of justiciability to prevent such review. 42 Several policies have been cited.
First, courts recognize the differences between the military and civilian so-
ciety.4 3 The military's need for strict discipline and uniformity often requires
more control over the lives of military personnel than would be tolerated in
civilian society. Second, some courts have cited judicial economy as a rationale
for reluctant review of military decisions, noting the large number of lawsuits
that would result from widespread review of claims by military personnel.
4
Third, courts recognize the technical nature of military affairs and are often
reluctant to substitute their judgments for the decisions of persons trained
in military matters. 45 And finally, courts recognize the importance of the
military's mission-national defense.46 As one court stated, the United States
Armed Forces should concentrate on defending the country, rather than de-
fending lawsuits.
47
Because of this reluctance to review military actions, courts have struggled
to find a consistent policy to guide them in deciding when review of military
actions is appropriate. The most structured and comprehensive test to date
was created by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mindes v.
Seaman.4 8 Air Force Captain Milbert Mindes received an adverse Officer Ef-
fectiveness Report that caused him to be separated from active duty. After
exhausting all available military avenues in an attempt to void the report and
return to aclive duty, Mindes filed suit in federal district court. The district
court dismissed the suit with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and Mindes
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit noted the policies against judicial review of military deci-
sions and deliberately set out to collect and collate past decisions into a ra-
tional test for judicial review of military actions. The resulting test consists
of two parts. First, a court should not review internal military affairs unless
the plaintiff (1) alleges the violation of a constitutional right, applicable statute,
or military regulation, and (2) shows that he has exhausted all available
42. See generally Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84
COLuM. L. REv. 387 (1984).
43. Id. at 392-103.
44. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971).
45. See Note, .-upra note 42, at 392-403.
46. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 199.
47. Poe v. Kuyk, 448 F. Supp. 1231, 1234-35 (D. Del. 1978).




remedial procedures within the military.49 If the plaintiff meets this burden,
the court must then balance the policies favoring nonreview of military af-
fairs to determine if judicial review is warranted.5 0
The court provided four factors that should be weighed in the second step
of the test to determine the reviewability of the plaintiff's claim. First, the
nature and strength of the plaintiff's claim must be considered.-" Constitu-
tional claims will carry more weight than claims based on a statute or military
regulation. Likewise, some constitutional claims will carry more weight than
others. For example, a claim involving personal liberty is stronger than a claim
based on a haircut regulation. 2 Claims that are obviously weak will strongly
suggest declining to review.
5 3
Second, the court must consider the potential injury to the plaintiff if review
is refused. 4 This factor is closely tied to the nature of the plaintiff's claim
considered above. If potential harm to the plaintiff from a denial of review
is substantial, this factor militates in favor of review.
Third, the type and degree of interference in military affairs that will result
from judicial review must be considered.5 5 Judicial review of any claim brought
by military personnel will involve some interference in military matters. Thus,
interference per se should not indicate declining to review. But if review will
seriously impede the performance of vital military functions, judicial review
is strongly discouraged.
5 6
Finally, a court must consider the extent to which military expertise is in-
volved in the challenged action.5 Courts should defer to the decisions of those
well-trained in military affairs when matters such as promotions or orders
directly related to specific military missions are challenged. 8
The court remanded Mindes' claim to be evaluated by the district court
according to the new test.59 To date, at least eight federal circuits have adopted
the Mindes test.6"









58. Id. at 201-02.
59. Id. at 202.
60. See Khalsa v. Weinberger, 759 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1985); Gonzalez v. Department of
the Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Rucker v. Secretary of the Army, 702 F.2d 966 (11th
Cir. 1983); Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983);
Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981); Wallace v. Chappell, 661 F.2d 729 (9th
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 296 (1983); NeSmith v. Fulton, 615 F.2d 196 (5th
Cir. 1980); Schlanger v. United States, 586 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943
(1979); West v. Brown, 558 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978). Contra,
Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981) (expressly rejecting Mindes test); Dilley v. Alex-
ander, 603 F.2d 914 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting preliminary screening of military cases for
justiciability, which is the essence of the Mindes test). See generally Note, supra note 42.
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Application of the Mindes Test to the Fifth Amendment
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The fifth amendment protection against coerced self-incrimination offered
to civilian government employees, should be available to military personnel
if claims for such protection by service members are justiciable. Because the
Mindes test represents the most structured and comprehensive analysis of
military claims and is the test used in the majority of federal circuits, an ap-
plication of that test to the present issue should provide the answer. The policies
that must be weighed are the following: (1) the nature and strength of the
military advisers' challenge to the President's order to testify; (2) the poten-
tial injury to these individuals if federal review is refused; (3) the type and
degree of interference in military affairs that would result from judicial review
of the President's action; and (4) the extent to which military expertise is in-
volved in the President's decision.
6'
The first two factors may be considered together. The challenge to the Presi-
dent's order to testify is based on the constitutional privilege to avoid self-
incrimination. Thus, the military advisers' claims begin at the higher end of
the Mindes scale, above challenges to statutes or regulations.6" Furthermore,
the fifth amendment privilege to avoid self-incrimination involves personal
liberty; the possibility exists that the President's military advisers will be con-
victed of a criminal offense if they testify without immunity. According to
Mindes, a constitutional claim involving personal liberty is one of the strongest
that can be asserted.63 This strongly suggests judicial review. The potential
injury to the advisers, ranging from loss of employment to incarceration, also
strongly suggests judicial review.
The degree of interference in military affairs that would result from judicial
review of the President's action seems limited. Although the substance of the
expected testimony may be military in nature, the act of requiring a service
member to testify before congressional committees does not involve a vital
military function; consequently, judicial review of the decision on constitu-
tional grounds should not seriously impede any vital military function. A
presidential decision to order testimony before congressional committees does
not appear to involve military expertise, either. Such a decision would be
primarily political in nature, unrelated to any specific objectives of the armed
forces.61
61. These factors, set forth in Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201-02, are applied to the present issue.
62. Minde:, 453 F.2d at 201.
63. Id. See supra text accompanying note 52.
64. The third and fourth Mindes factors-the degree of interference in military affairs and
the necessity of military expertise-relate to judicial concerns of substituting court judgments
for the decisions of persons specially trained in military affairs. Thus, these factors use the term
"military" according to its common definition, referring to activities of the armed forces necessary
to achieve the overall objective of national defense. Most actions deemed to be military in nature
are personnel actions, such as promotion, demotion, training, and discipline of service members.
See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force regulation requiring service members to




A balance of these factors weighs heavily on the side of allowing review
of the President's action. Thus, claims by service members based upon the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination should be justiciable.
Military personnel should receive judicial enforcement of the fifth amend-
ment's constructive immunity, preventing the use of coerced testimony in subse-
quent criminal actions against the advisers. Military personnel should also
enjoy the fifth amendment prohibition against coerced waivers of this con-
structive immunity.
Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has strictly protected the fifth amend-
ment privilege to avoid self-incrimination, particularly when authorities at-
tempt to coerce self-incrimination. If an individual is coerced into self-
incrimination by threats of loss of employment or loss of economic benefits,
his statements may not be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution against
him. Thus, any individual who bows to threats of punishment and testifies
without statutory immunity is provided with constructive immunity by the
fifth amendment.
In the case of public employees, however, the government may constitu-
tionally coerce testimony concerning official duties with threats of loss of
employment so long as the government does not attempt also to coerce a waiver
of immunity. The use of coercion provides the employee with fifth amend-
ment constructive immunity, preventing the use of the coerced testimony
against the employee in later criminal actions. Consequently, self-incrimination
cannot occur, and the employee must testify or face removal from office.
The government may not, however, coerce the employee into also waiving
immunity from prosecution. Such action violates the employee's fifth amend-
ment privilege because self-incrimination could occur; the employee's testimony
could be used against him. Any punitive action taken against an employee
who refuses to waive immunity is unconstitutional and will be remedied by
the courts.
The President's military advisers should receive the protection outlined
above, whether they are considered civilian government employees or military
personnel. Although federal courts traditionally hesitate to entertain claims
by service members for review of military actions, the policies favoring review
outweigh those against it. The fifth amendment privilege to avoid self-
incrimination is one of the strongest constitutional claims that can be made
tain loyalty, discipline, and morale); Khalsa v. Weinberger, 759 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1985) (plain-
tiff's claim that Army appearance regulations violated his first amendment right to free exercise
of religion was nonreviewable under Mindes test); Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.
1982) (equal protection challenge to Air Force commissioning program's maximum age require-
ment nonreviewable under Mindes), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); Lindenau v. Alexander,
663 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1981) (National Guard regulation preventing enlistment of single parents
with custody of minor children upheld under Mindes test). Requiring military personnel to testify
before congressional committees is not an action relating to any such specific military objective.
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because it involves personal liberty. The potential injuries to the President's
military advisers in the absence of judicial review are serious, ranging from
loss of employment to incarceration. In contrast, a presidential order that
military advisers testify before congressional committees is not an order relating
to specific military objectives; it does not involve military expertise. Moreover,
any interference into military matters that might result from judicial review
of the President's order appears very limited. Accordingly, the President's
military advisers should expect full protection of their fifth amendment rights
in this situation.
Therefore, it is clear that the President may constitutionally use threats of
punitive action to force his military advisers to answer questions specifically,
directly, and narrowly related to their duties so long as he does not attempt
to coerce the advisers into waiving immunity. If the President's military ad-
visers give in to threats of punitive action and testify without statutory im-
munity, the fifth amendment will provide them with constructive immunity;
their statements cannot be used in any criminal action against them.65 If the
advisers refuse to testify about their duties, the President can legally impose
the threatened punitive action. If, however, the President attempts to coerce
the advisers into waiving immunity, the President's action will be unconstitu-
tional; and the advisers may seek judicial protection from any penalty.
Ray D. Weston, Jr.
65. This conclusion brings about an interesting result: the President may have the ability
to provide his advisers with immunity if he wishes to protect them from criminal prosecution.
In the absence of rtatutory immunity provided by Congress, the President might provide the
advisers with constructive immunity by.threatening punitive action if they refuse to testify. If
the advisers then testified under such coercion, Garrity should give rise to fifth amendment con-
structive immunity and prevent use of their testimony against them in later criminal proceedings.
However, a host of additional issues beyond the scope of this note would be raised by the Presi-
dent's actual intent to immunize the advisers' testimony.
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